Introduction
The key to the success of contemporary societies may be the, frequently uneasy, relationship between the capitalist economy and representative democracy. The tension between the currencies of the market and democracy, between money and votes, is an inherent one. It is a cause of constant controversy in public and academic debate. Nonetheless, there is a dearth of research on the relationship between firms and parties, which are, respectively, the key organisations of capitalism and representative democracy. This paper approaches party-firm relations through a study of the political contributions of 960 firms in three countries for periods between seven and seventeen years. For the remainder of this introduction, I briefly review the (non-)literature on the relationship between political parties and firms. In the next section, I outline my theoretical framework. Then, I justify the country-case selection as well as samples and of firms. Section Four presents descriptive and multinomial logit analyses of firm strategy. Section Five consists of case studies of firms' reactions to changes of government in the three countries. The penultimate section considers some threats to the robustness of the findings. Finally, I offer a mixture of relatively strong and speculative conclusions.
The study of business associations long dominated the literature on business-government relations (Greenwood and Jacek 2000; Schmitter and Streeck 1981 ). An increasing focus on the political activities of individual firms (Hillman et al 2004; Martin 2000; Salisbury 1984 ) has concentrated on the choice between different modes of lobbying (Bennett 1999; Coen 1997) . Studies of the relationship between firms and parties have been rare, even though it is some time since Grant pointed out this is the dominant business-political relationship in some countries (Grant 1993, pp. 13-18; Grant et al 1989) . The recent flowering of research on corruption also tends to neglect the party-firm nexus. The literature on US political finance does share this paper's concern with ideological and pragmatic motivations of political contributions by firms (Ansolabehere et al 2003; Burris 2001; Clawson et al 1998; McMenamin 2008b; Stratmann 2005) . However, the restrictive and labyrinthine system of political finance and the candidate-centred electoral system seriously undermine the extent to which this literature can be interpreted in terms of party-firm relations.
Studies of comparative political finance tend to tabulate sources of income and expenditure in broad categories (Nassmacher 2001; Scarrow 2007; Smilov and Toplak 2007) . In so far as they track the relationship between individual firms and parties, it is usually to report on scandals. There is a handful of interesting country studies based on firms (Bond 2007; Fisher 1994; McMenamin 2004; McMenamin 2008a; McMenamin and Schoenman 2007; Ramsay et al 2002; Scarrrow 2006; Stanbury 1993, pp. 291-318) but no systematic comparative treatment that I know of. Therefore, I
need to outline my own comparative framework.
Theoretical Framework: Ideology and Pragmatism
The motivations of businesses contributing financially to political parties can be thought of as either pragmatic or ideological. Ideological decisions do not survive a cost-benefit analysis and are, instead, motivated by a long-term commitment to a class interest or even the wider public good.
Pragmatic contributions are business decisions motivated by the relatively short-term profit motive of a particular organisation. There is a very large literature, which tries to identify the benefit of political contributions by US businesses. Contributions are variously interpreted as more or less legal bribery (Drope and Hansen 2004) , purchase of access to politicians (Hall and Wayman 1991) , mere gifts (Milyo 2002) , and as "interested gifts", which generate an obligation to reciprocate (Clawson et al 1998; Gordon 2005) . While I assume that pragmatic payments are interested, I make no assumptions regarding the nature or value of possible benefits.
The distribution of ideologically motivated donations should be relatively stable over time. Party ideologies change slowly. Even if parties tack to the left or the right for tactical reasons, it is rare for the left-right ranking of parties to change. In contrast, the distribution of pragmatic donations should follow short-term changes in the distribution of political power. These two motivations may interact in a single decision about the distribution of political contributions. For example, take a firm that has an ideological preference for the right. Under a left-wing government it may be prepared to contribute to the left, while also continuing to express its ideological preference by funding the right-wing opposition. More generally, this interaction can be thought about quantitatively. Imagine an index of political power that runs from zero, when the right holds all power, to one hundred, when the left has a power monopoly. Also, let there be a measure of ideology: zero for a position at which any funding to the left is unacceptable and one for no ideological preference between left and right. The product of these two is the percentage of a firm's political contributions donated to the left. So, a firm, which assesses all power to be held by the left, will contribute exclusively to the left if its ideological score is one, i.e. if its motivation is purely pragmatic. It will contribute zero to the left if its motivation is a purely ideological commitment to the right. A firm, the right-wing preference of which is tempered by pragmatism, might split its contributions equally between left and right. Please see Table One . The discussion of ideology and pragmatism has lead us to think of a firm's distribution of cash to parties as a strategic decision taking into account political power and the firm's ideological position, if it has one. At a point in time, the distribution of a firm's money can be to the left, to the right, a hedge between left and right, and, of course, a firm can decide not to contribute. If we consider two time points, shifts between the four basic distributions give us the sixteen strategies in Table Two .
If the two time points are divided by a change of government we can identify some of the strategies as clear indicators of ideological (colour-coded red) and pragmatic motivations (colour-coded green). In this example, a left-wing government has replaced a right-wing government. I infer that firms that gave to the left in opposition, as well as in government, are ideologically committed to the left. Similarly, I infer that firms that continue to give to the right, even after its ejection from government, are committed to a right-wing ideology. Firms that shift from right to left, as power shifts from right to left, I classify as pragmatic. Those that hedge before and after the election, have no ideological preference, and are pursuing a pragmatic, low-risk strategy. Other strategies suggest an interaction of ideological and pragmatic motivations (colour-coded purple). Those that did not contribute while the right were in power, but contribute to the left when in power, combine an ideological preference for the left with a pragmatic desire not to signal hostility to a right-wing government. Firms that hedge under the right but, under a left-wing government, contribute exclusively to the left, suggest a similar mix of pragmatism towards right-wing governments and a preference for the left. The same logic applies to those that contributed to a right-wing government but abstain from political finance under the left and firms that plumped for the right in government but hedge after a turnover. The other seven cells do not have implications for the underlying motivations of the firms. introduce the data with which I intend to test these hypotheses on institutions, ideology and strategy in party-firm relations.
Cases and Samples
The criteria according to which I have chosen my country cases are the transparency and permissiveness of the political finance regime and the existence of a government turnover. As already mentioned, there is a massive literature on political contributions by US firms, which frequently attempts to draw conclusions regarding the motivations of firms. This literature was made possible by the disclosure requirements introduced after the Watergate scandal of 1974.
However, the "bizarre and incongruous regulations" (Persily 2006, p. 219) high levels of transparency. In all three countries, political donations by businesses had to be reported. The limit above which disclosure was required varied. In Canada it was only C$100, in Australia A$1,500 and in Germany a much higher DM20,000 (reduced to €10,000 from 2002). The
Australian system reports all payments to political parties, whether they are donations or not. A lack of enforcement of the rules regarding the definition of a donation means that many political contributions are reported as "other payments". In contrast to the US, there were no limits in any country on the amounts of money businesses could give. Neither were there restrictions on the purposes for which it could be used. The only significant restriction on source was that donations by foreign businesses were banned. Thus, reported payments represent an almost pure indicator of the political calculations of businesses, rather than flows of money that have been warped and constrained by a regulatory system. Since 2001, the UK has had a system with similar transparency and permissiveness. However, there has yet to be a turnover under this regime. Australia, Canada and Germany seem to be the only three cases currently existing, which combine transparency, permissiveness and a turnover, to provide vital intra-case variation in political circumstances.
The three countries also differ in the ideological distance between their principal political parties, and, therefore, also vary in the potential for ideological behaviour in party-firm relations. The most obvious contrast is between Canada and the other two cases. The two traditional competitors in the Canadian system, and the only two to have formed governments, are the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives (PC). Both were long regarded as "brokerage" parties, which assembled relatively diverse electoral coalitions from across Canada. Before the earthquake election of 1993, the two had very similar profiles on economic matters, with the Progressive Conservatives having a somewhat stricter reputation in relation to budgetary management (Bélanger 2003, p. 544) . Prior to 1993, the main competitor of the two main parties was the New Democratic Party, the "social conscience of Canada". In 1993, the PC's parliamentary representation was almost eliminated by the emergence of the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois.
The left-right divide has dominated Australian and German politics. In Germany, the centre-right has been occupied by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and its rather more conservative This meant the SPD had serious competition on its left and reduced incentives for the SDP to move to the center (Kitschelt 1999, p. 329) . In recent decades, the ideological histories of the ALP and the SPD have been very different. The ALP entered government in 1983, and became one of the most renowned deregulatory governments in the world, never mind one of the leading deregulatory left-of-centre governments (McMullin 1991, pp. 418-432, 442-43) . The SPD were in opposition from 1982 to 1998. They returned to power in 1998, in coalition with the Greens, having campaigned on a "neue Mitte" platform. Thus, the German SPD's decisive move to the centre came later, was less dramatic, and seemed more politically constrained than that of the ALP (Padgett 2003, p. 42) . Overall, these party system sketches suggest the countries can be ranked in the following order of potential for ideological party-firm relations: Germany, Australia, Canada.
Finally, the three countries vary in the extent to which a second chamber can restrain the power of the majority in the lower house. The Canadian Senate is a weak revisionary chamber (Luzstig 1995; Simeon 2004, 100) In all three countries, I have drawn samples from published lists of large firms. Practical considerations resulted in differences in the length of the lists and periods used to define the three samples. Nonetheless, the country samples represent essentially comparable groups of consistently very large firms. The research design avoids the potential sample selection bias sometimes evident in the study of the distribution of contributions (Burris 2001; Fisher 1994) . The Australian dataset exploits the essentially uniform political finance regulations and party systems at the federal level and in the six states, while the Canadian and German studies are restricted to the federal level.
There is at least one clear turnover in each sample. Please see Table Three for basic information about the samples. The next section uses this data to test the theory developed earlier in the paper. 
Data analysis
Both descriptive and multivariate analyses provide useful evidence in evaluating the institutional and party system hypotheses on cross-national variations in firm strategy. The dependent variable is calculated from the official reports for each country. The Australian figures incorporate payments to "associated entities", as well as direct payments to parties. "Donations" as well as "other payments" are included. Elsewhere, I have shown that these "other payments" behave similarly to those classified as donations and in a way consistent with political contributions (McMenamin 2008a, pp. 382-287) . There is a strong contrast between the contribution rate in The descriptive statistics suggest that institutional variation does not provide a powerful explanation for patterns of business contributions to parties. Indeed, the cross-national pattern is the inverse of that expected. Hedging is by far at its most important in Canada, with its weak Senate, and very rare in Germany, with its powerful Bundesrat. The institutional theory does get some support from Australia. Less than six per cent of payments are hedged in unicameral Queensland. In the other jurisdictions the percentages hedging vary from eighteen to forty-three. The raw distributions clearly suggest more ideological behaviour in Germany but a more accurate account requires multivariate analysis, the variables for which I introduce next.
The first variable is a simple dummy for left-wing control of government. Next comes a control for the electoral timetable, which counts the number of years until the next constitutionally mandated election. The first economic variable is revenue (logged to reduce the impact of outliers). The firms have been classified into seven sectors, based on amalgamations of the UN ISIC classification. This was necessary because of collinearity problems in more disaggregated versions.
In the next section, these variables are used to predict the firms' contribution strategies. In Table Four , I predict firm strategy using a maximum likelihood multinomial logit with random parameters. While this model is suitable for the nature of the dependent variable and the panel design of the dataset, unfortunately, it cannot adjust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Australian and Canadian models predict contributions according to the framework introduced above. For the German sample, it was necessary to collapse the hedge and left-wing categories.
The separate equations predict the logged odds of each of the contribution categories by reference to non-contribution. The sectoral dummies are not shown. They are mostly significant in the Australian and Canadian cases but only sporadically so for Germany. Income is statistically significant in all equations, and, in line with theory, the coefficients are bigger for the hedging category that for those firms that opt for left or right. It is also unsurprising that the number of years to the election is always negative and almost always highly statistically significant. 1983 , 1987 . The income of German banks has been imputed from their assets according to the relationship between assets and income in the Australian sample. German incomes imputed from data for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2005 While multinomial logits offer a rigorous analysis of rich data they are difficult to directly summarise. However, it is possible to do so by manipulating the predictions implied by the models.
Please see Table Five . If ideology is not important the parties should be treated identically in identical positions of political power. The models predict that, in Australia, the probability of a given firm contributing to a right-wing government is twice that of a left-wing government. In Canada, there is a small bias towards the Liberals. The probability of a contribution to a right-wing German government is over eleven times larger than the probability of a contribution to its leftwing counterpart. The conflation of hedging and leftist contributions in Germany means the ideological bias is even larger than this figure. Changes of government are predicted to produce a seventeen per cent increase in the probability of a contribution to the newly governing party in Australia, a whopping forty per cent in Canada, and a distinctly modest ten per cent in Germany.
Unfortunately, the German figure may be underestimated due to the combination of hedging and contributions to the left. Table 4 for a manufacturing firm (the modal sector in all three countries), with a mean income and the mean number of years to an election. The ideology figure compares the probability of a contribution to a right-wing government to that for a left-wing government. If the right-wing probability is larger the statistic is the right divided by the left.
If the left-wing probability is larger the statistic is the left divided by the right. The incumbency measure compares probabilities of contribution to the right and the left in opposition and in government. The score is the mean of the government minus the opposition probabilities for the two parties as a percentage of the mean total probability of contributions to either party when either is in government.
While the multinomial logit analysis has clear implications for strategy over time, it is not a truly dynamic form of analysis. Therefore, in order to further explore firm strategies in relation to incumbency, I present case studies of firm strategies before and after the turnovers of 1993 in Canada, 1998 in Germany and 2002 in South Australia. This exercise is not subject to formal statistical tests but it is undertaken with the backing of the previous significant results for leftist government in the logit models. The case studies provide some validation of the key prediction of the pragmatic logic: that a change of government changes business strategy.
For each country, I classify every firm that contributed to the political parties in the parliament before and/or after the turnover. The main problem in doing so is changing contribution rates across parliaments. In particular, I do not classify those who begin contributing to a party once it has lost control of government. This is definitely not a pragmatic strategy, but it might be the beginning of an ideological strategy.
The first case study is of the turnover of 2002 in South Australia. This state has a population of 1.6 million. Its government depends on support in the forty-seven-seat assembly. In South Australia, the Australian Labor Party reflected quite closely the political transformation undergone at federal level in the 1980s and 90s (McMullin 1991, p. 439) . The National party has been so marginal as to not feature in government. The Liberals had been in power since 1993, but since the 1997 election they had oscillated between bare majority and minority government, as a number of members moved in and out of the Liberal party. Business associations were vocal in emphasising government spending on infrastructure rather than services, which seemed to be the main concern of the electorate as a whole (Stock 2002, p. 541) . The Liberals' record of privatisation was a liability with most voters, and the performance of private monopoly utilities was also the target of criticism from businesses. In spite of this, as the election approached, after second preferences, the polls were predicting almost no difference between the Labor and the Liberals. In the end, the formation of a Labor government had to depend on negotiations with independents. In Table Six The election results were difficult to predict for many reasons, including small poll differences between the PC and the Liberals and the rise of two new regionally focused parties as serious contenders, the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois (Cairns 1994, p. 221) . Regardless of serious economic problems, constitutional and cultural issues played a major part in the campaign. There was an implicit consensus between the PC and Liberals that the welfare state would suffer in the struggle to control the public finances. The changes in vote shares were dramatic and the votes were grossly distorted by the interaction between the first-past-the-post electoral system and contrasts in the regional distribution of party votes. The governing PC was reduced to two members, while the Liberals received a huge bonus. Table Seven shows the Canadian figures. The largest category of Canadian firms, at eighteen per cent, consists of those who hedged irrespective of the government. The cynical strategy of shifting from Progressive Conservatives to Liberals is well represented at over ten per cent. The second largest category is to hedge under the PC and then commit to the Liberals. This is by far the largest of the categories, which suggest an interaction of pragmatic and ideological logics. Small, but far from trivial, numbers of companies seem to be ideological, cleaving to the PC or the Liberals, whether in government or not. There is almost no nuance with which to distinguish the interpretation of this case study from that of the general model of Canada. After all, the election did define the whole period from which the Canadian data is drawn: a two-term Progressive Conservative government was followed by a period of extended Liberal hegemony. Notes: PC=Progressive Conservative Party. N=191. 169 companies contributed in the period 1989-1997. 1988-1993 counted as the Progressive Conservatives' period in government, even though the 1993 election was in October. 1994-1997 counted as the Liberals period in government. The Liberals continued in power after the June 1997 election. There were 9.5 times as many contributors inside the colour-coded categories as outside them.
The 1998 German election was also unusual in that it, rather than the break-up of a coalition, initiated a change of government. However, there was no major change to the party system. The election marked the end of a coalition of the Christian Democratic parties and the Free Democrats that had lasted since 1982. The election campaign was low on ideological conflict between the two main parties, as the SPD moved towards the centre under Gerhard Schröder and his "neue Mitte" strategy but was willing to follow state-level precedents in forming a coalition with the Greens.
Therefore, the election was seen as a competition between the existing government and the alternative Red-Green coalition, even though there was ambiguity right until late on election day (Padgett 1999, p. 103) . Polls consistently pointed towards a Red-Green victory. Table Eight presents firm strategies around the German turnover of 1998. The case study confirms that the uniformly right-wing ideological orientation of German business interacts with pragmatism.
The most frequent turnover strategy was for right-supporting firms to desist from political contributions under the Red-Green government. This is in contrast to the logit model, which predicts that non-contributors will contribute to the left once it gains control of the government.
Next most popular to this ideological-pragmatic strategy was a purely ideological strategy of continuing payments to the centre-right, whether they controlled the executive or not. The vast majority of firms outside the classification had started contributing to the right outside of government. The comparison of the three case studies also fits the ranking of the potential for ideological behaviour based on the party-system sketches that I offered earlier on. A firm-level calculation, which interacts ideology and an assessment of political power, provides an attractive explanation for the association between ideological divides at the party system level and patterns of political contribution at the firm level. Clearly, there are only three cases and this association does not provide direct evidence on the posited causal mechanism. Nevertheless, this paper does claim to have established that a simple interaction of pragmatism and ideology is a plausible theory of partyfirm relations in capitalist democracies. Although the three countries display variation in the ideological spread of their principal political parties, they were largely chosen for country-level analytical advantages, rather than their suitability for controlled comparison. However, they do not seem to be homogeneous in terms of any obvious factor that would restrict the generalisation of the abstractly stated theory offered here. Indeed, their heterogeneity in terms of legislative institutions does not seem to affect the distribution of payments in the expected manner. The scope of the theory linking party systems and party-firm relations remains to be investigated.
Robustness
Now, I would like to consider some potential threats to the basic finding that incumbency explains variations in strategy in all three countries. In other words, I look for sources of a Type I error, or a false positive. These come from omitted variable bias and measurement error in the areas of political finance regulation, the economy and the party system. Firstly, I examine issues relating to the regulatory regime. There is a contrast between the high limit for disclosure in Germany and the lower limits in the other two countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some donors have broken up contributions in order to avoid disclosure (Clemens 2000, p. 34) . The high limit may mask very different strategies in Germany. I test for robustness to this problem using restricted samples from Australia and Canada. I calculated the German limit as a percentage of average revenue in the sample, and then removed all payments below this percentage from the other two samples. Even though the number of observations is much smaller, the results (not shown) are essentially the same.
Another regulatory issue is the possibility of donating to individual candidates rather than political parties. There is little evidence that this channel has been important, except perhaps in Canada (Stanbury 1993, pp. 127-28) . If some of the contributions were aimed at constituencies (known as "ridings" in Canada), this would tend to deflate, rather than inflate, the effect of incumbency of the national executive. As already mentioned, I have shown elsewhere that ambiguities in the Australian classification of payments probably do not cause a problem for this sort of analysis.
Finally, it is generally accepted that reporting in the three countries has generally been comprehensive and this does not seem like a major source of bias.
Secondly, I examine possible problems in relation to the economic variables. The high level of sectoral aggregation may underestimates the effect economic sector has on the political activity of firms. My earlier analysis of the Australian dataset, using twenty-seven sectors did not produce different results regarding incumbency (McMenamin 2008a) . The extent of regulation should be a powerful influence on the political activity of firms (Burris 2001, 371) . However, this is very difficult to measure validly at the national, never mind the cross-national, level. Again, a regulation variable did not change the political results in the Australian sample. Another economic complication arises from the assumption of the independence of cases, when firms may actually form networks defined by education, social clubs, and interlocking directorates (Bond 2007; Heinz et al 1993; Mills 1959; Useem 1984) . The most important networks are probably those defined by cross-ownership, a well-known feature of the German economy (Vitols 2001, p. 341-343) . Treating firms as entirely separate might underestimate the amount of hedging that really takes place.
However, in contrast to other observers (Nassmacher 2001, p. 106 were unlikely recipients of business donations, but did receive a couple of donations from the Bertelsmann media group. In relation to Canada, I have not taken account of the fact that, in the aftermath of the disastrous election of 1993, the Progressive Conservatives no longer represented the centre-right alone. Indeed, there is evidence that the Reform party was drawing revenue away from the PC before the election (Stanbury 1993, p. 105) . Thus, the Canadian results may overreport the effect of incumbency and underestimate ideological behaviour amongst Canadian businesses. All three of the countries are federal. In Canada, the federal organisation of the Progressive Conservatives was completely separate from the provincial organisation (Stanbury 1993, p. 80) . The Liberal organisation was separate for the four provinces that constitute eighty-six per cent of the population (Stanbury 1993, p. 115) . In Australia, federal and state parties have clear equivalents, but tend to be organisationally separate (Sharman and Moon 2003, p. 258 ). The analysis above is based on separate returns for state and federal parties in Australia. The records do show up transfers between different branches of the parties but these do not seem to be very large in the context of their overall turnover and there is no clear link to business contributions. Thus, in Australia and Canada, federalism does not pose a problem. The German parties are much more centralised. The disclosure records do not make it clear to which level of a party money was given, although it seems to be widely assumed that the donations are aimed at the federal level (Clemens 2000, p. 28) . If donations are intended for the state parties, this should create a bias against my variables, which are measured at the federal level. Therefore, it suggests an even stronger positive relationship than that reported above.
While the caveats are worth mentioning, in total, I do not see a reason to revise the basic conclusion that the left-wing government dummy demonstrates a clear pragmatic logic in all three countries.
The three different types of evidence -descriptive statistics, multinomial logit, and turnover case study, with their strengths and weaknesses, -all support this conclusion.
Conclusions
I have made an argument that sits comfortably in the tradition of comparative politics. The dependent variable is driven by variations in national political context but these contextual differences can be understood in a general framework. Familiar as the form of the argument may be, its subject is a new one. There has been little or no systematic study of variations in party-firm relations. This vacuum is unfortunate as he subject is an important one. Firms and parties are, respectively, the key collective actors of capitalism and representative democracy.
I would like to offer five conclusions. Firstly, I hope to have shown that rigorous statistical study of the financial relations between firms and parties is possible and desirable for cases other than the USA. Secondly, firms adjust their relationship with parties in reaction to changes in political power in all three countries. Thirdly, the mix of ideological and pragmatic motivations varies across the cases, with Canada the most pragmatic and Germany the most ideological. Fourthly, the pattern of hedging does not provide support for an institutional approach to cross-national party-firm relations.
Fifthly and finally, I have provided enough theoretical and empirical argument to propose a plausible general hypothesis that explains variations in party-firm relations by differences in party systems. A large number of countries now meet the requirements of transparency and permissiveness that allow for useful statistical studies of business contributions to parties (McMenamin 2008b) . As internal variation develops over time, these countries will be available for analysis in the style of this paper. Therefore, the general arguments made in this paper have the potential for wider comparative testing. 
Appendix: Descriptive Statistics

